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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MEASURES TO INCREASE
APPELLATE COURT EFFICIENCY
AND DECISION OUTPUTt
Thomas B. Marvell* and Carlisle E. Moody**
Appellate court caseloads have increased greatly since World
War II, doubling approximately every ten years. 1 Because states
created appellate judgeships only one-third as fast as caseloads
grew, 2 the judges have faced heavy demands to increase productivity. Most state appellate courts successfully expanded decision output to match the appeals "explosion"; decision growth
averaged 116% over the ten-year period from 1974 to 1984, only
slightly less than the 123 % growth for filings over the corresponding period. 3 Output per judge increased, on average, from
fifty-three to eighty-eight decisions in the 1974-1984 period for
the forty-five states with available information.'
The plight of the appellate courts has resulted in an enormous
body of literature recommending procedures for increasing judicial resources and judicial productivity. 11 The literature, however,

t This research was supported by Grant 83-IJ-CX-4046 given by the National
Institute of Justice to Court Studies, Inc. The contents do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Institute.
* Court Studies, Inc., Williamsburg, Virginia. B.A., Harvard, 1961; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1964; Ph.D. (sociology), University of Michigan, 1976.
** Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
B.A., Colby College, 1965; Ph.D. (economics), University of Connecticut, 1970.
1. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BULLETIN: 1973-83
TRENDS, THE GROWTH OF APPEALS 2 (1985) (discussing increase in appellate caseload over
recent 10-year period); Marvell, Appellate Court Caseloads: Historical Trends, 4 APPELLATE CT. ADMIN. REV. 3 (1983). Research in progress by the authors, however, suggests
that appellate filing growth slowed greatly during the mid-1980's, especially in civil cases.
This trend was forecast, id. at 7, because civil caseload trends tend to follow economic
trends, and the nation experienced recessions in 1980 and 1982.
2. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Marvell, State Appellate Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE
(1988) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Responses to Caseload Growth]. This is based on 39
states' filings for the 10 years from 1973 to 1983 and decisions for the 10 years from 1974
to 1984. Decisions lag a year because courts take about a year to decide appeals. "Decisions" and "filings" are defined infra note 42 and text accompanying 56.
4. Responses to Caseload Growth, supra note 3.
5. See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS (1977); P. CAR·
RINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); COMMISSION ON STAN415
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has not provided more than educated guesses about which procedures work best. This Article attempts to fill this void by evaluating the changes that state appellate courts have made to increase decision output. The changes fall into seven categories:
(1) adding judges or temporarily assigning trial and retired
judges; (2) hiring law clerks and staff attorneys; (3) curtailing
opinion practices by deciding cases with unpublished opinions,
with unsigned opinions, or without opinions; (4) creating or expanding intermediate courts; (5) reducing the nu~ber of judges
who participate in each decision; (6) curtailing oral arguments;
and (7) using summary judgment procedures. These categories
encompass virtually all of the major changes that appellate
courts have made to increase productivity in the past two decades. 6 Although questions of productivity and efficiency are
never the sole criteria for determining how appellate courts
should adapt to rising caseloads, knowledge about which changes
actually do increase productivity and efficiency, and by how
much, should be valuable information when making such
decisions.
This Article will examine the effectiveness of measures commonly employed to increase appellate court productivity. Part I
of the Article sets forth some common design problems and explains how the research technique employed in the present
study avoids these problems by using a multiple time-series research design. Part II applies this design to state court data.
Part II also describes the dependent variable, the number of appeals decided per judge, used in the regression analysis. Part III
discusses the results of that analysis-the impact of each change
listed above on judicial productivity. The Article, although not
advocating the adoption of the discussed efficiency measures,
concludes that the failure to enact any type of efficiency measure will cause appellate courts to fall behind in the handling of
their caseloads.
DARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS

(1977); R.

LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS

(1976); T.

MARVELL, BIBLIOGRAPHY: STATE APPELLATE COURT ADAPTATION TO CASELOAD AND DELAY

(1985); T. MARVELL, BIBLIOGRAPHY: STATE APPELLATE COURT WORKLOAD AND
(1979); D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOL·
UME (1974); Marvell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRON L. REV. 43
(1982).

PROBLEMS
DELAY

6.

See infra note 45.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

Empirical research requires good research design. In the same
manner that a building cannot be trusted if its structural design
is substandard, research findings lack credibility if the research
design is faulty. The empirical study of courts, however, differs
from building construction in that researchers frequently ignore
the generally accepted design standards. As a result, judges and
others should not rely on the conclusions of most court research.
The major difficulty in empirical research is differentiating the
impact of numerous factors that affect the studied variables.
The present research, evaluating changes made in appellate
courts, provides a good illustration. One cannot easily distinguish the impact of any one particular change, such as adding
staff attorneys, from the impact of other innovations designed to
improve efficiency and from the impact of numerous other developments in the courts. Most appellate courts have taken multiple procedural and structural steps to increase productivity.
Further, these steps are not one-shot, discrete events; rather, the
courts regularly expand the use of particular innovations. For
example, courts typically increase attorney staffs incrementally,
and they usually phase in new efficiency programs-such as reducing opinion publication-over several years. Courts, moreover, sometimes reverse or eliminate such steps, especially when
new judgeships are created.
Productivity is also affected by innumerable events other than
the changes designed to improve operations. The most important, as will be explained later, is the volume of filings. Judge
turnover and changes in composition of caseloads may also be
important. Furthermore, caseload volume can indirectly cause
courts to adopt procedures designed to stimulate output-reciprocal causation. In sum, there is a tangled mass of
forces operating in each court, and an acceptable research design
must present a credible mechanism for distinguishing the impact of particular forces.
A large volume of literature exists that specifies which research designs are acceptable for distinguishing between causal
factors. 7 Still, commentators criticize research on the courts and
7.

See generally

D. CAMPBELL

& J.

STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL

(1963); T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN
& ANALYSIS FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979). For law and society research, see J. MONAHAN &
L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (1985); Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in
the Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, 1 LAW & Soc'y

DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH
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other aspects of the justice system for using poor research designs. 8 Researchers in this area, in fact, generally ignore the accumulated social science knowledge about how to conduct research: They seldom refer to, or otherwise base their methods
on, methodological texts or other authorities, and they infrequently warn readers that research design problems render the
results uncertain. From the social science perspective, these
omissions are tantamount to professional malpractice. The result is the application of Gresham's law: "Bad research so turns
off decision makers that good research is largely ignored. " 9

A.

Unacceptable Research Designs

Two research designs that social science methodological writings single out as inadequate are the before-and-after design and
the cross-section design. Nevertheless, court researchers frequently use these designs.
1. The before-and-after design- Perhaps the most common,
and worst, design for evaluating changes in courts simply compares the situation in the years before the change to the situation in the years after. To study the impact of adding staff attorneys, for example, the before-and-after design compares the
number of cases decided per judge in one or a few years before
hiring the staff to the number of cases decided per judge during
the following few years. Such studies are virtually useless for
several reasons.
The first and most obvious problem is that other factors may
have caused any increase or decrease in decision output measured. For instance, one cannot determine whether the staff attorneys had an effect unless one concludes that all other likely
factors are known, and that they did not influence the results.
Such conclusions are rarely justified.

~

REV. 111 (1966); Lind, Shapard & Cecil, Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in the Justice System, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMM. ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 85-121 (1981); Luskin, Building a
Theory of Case-Processing Time, 62 JUDICATURE 114 (1978).
8. A major review of federally funded criminal justice research, including court research, concluded that the quality of such research was predominantly mediocre, mainly
because of poor research designs. COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUST., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CRIME: AN EVALUATION OF THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65-71, 92-96 (1977).
See also Luskin, supra note 7.
9. Johnson, Misuses of Applied Social Research, in THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COURTS 39, 41 (M. Saks & C. Baron eds. 1980).
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A good example of this type of problem appeared in an evaluation of an Arizona program designed to reduce delays by using
volunteer lawyers as temporary judges. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals used a large number of lawyer-judges
from late 1984 until mid-1986, such that the court was able to
increase the effective number of judges by nearly twenty percent.10 A study of the program 11 found that the time to decision
declined substantially in 1985 and 1986, and it attributed this
change to the lawyer-judges, as well as to increased efforts by
the regular judges. 12 The delay reduction, however, may have
had other causes. After several years of sharp increases, civil appeals coincidentally declined when the program began, 13 and another division of the court absorbed much of Division One's
caseload, further reducing caseload pressure. 14 Such major reductions in caseloads and backlogs provide an explanation for
the delay reduction that is at least as likely as the use of lawyerjudges. Other changes that may have contributed to the delay
reduction include the declining use of full opinions in favor of
shorter unpublished "memorandum" opinions 111 and the addition
of a second law clerk for most judges in 1985. 16
10. A. AIKMAN, M. ELSNER & F. MILLER, FRIENDS OF THE COURT: LAWYERS AS SUPPLEMENTAL JUDICIAL RESOURCES 84-111 (1987).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 98, 106-07.
13. Attorneys filed 537 civil appeals in 1980, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1982 ANNUAL JUDICIAL REPORT 17 (1983) [hereinafter 1982 JUDICIAL REPORT], 605 in 1984, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS
1984 JUDICIAL REPORT 7 (1985) [hereinafter 1984 JUDICIAL REPORT], 598 in 1985, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT 12 (1986)
[hereinafter 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT], and 563 in 1986, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT 15 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT]. A. AIKMAN, M. ELSNER & F. MILLER, supra note 10, at 85, erroneously show
a five-percent increase in 1985.
14. See, e.g., 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 12-13. Arizona's second intermediate court, Division Two, grew from three to six judges in early 1985. Id. at 13. Division One's backlog of civil appeals was significantly reduced by transferring a large number of cases from Division One to Division Two. In 1985, there was a net transfer, out of
Division One, of 52 cases. Fifty of these cases were transferred to Division Two. Id. at 1213. In 1986, a net 137 cases were transferred out of Division One, and 134 net cases were
transferred into Division Two. 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-16.
15. The court reports show that full opinions declined from 30% of civil decisions in
1984, 1984 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 7, to 19% in 1985, 1985 JUDICIAL REPORT,
supra note 13, at 12, and 25% in 1986, 1986 JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 15.
16. In 1983, there were 16 law clerks for the 15 judges in both divisions. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1983 CASELOAD, FINANCIAL, AND PERSONNEL REPORT (1984). In 1984, there were 21 clerks for 15 judges. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1984 CASELOAD, FINANCIAL, AND PERSONNEL
REPORT (1985). In 1985, there were 31 clerks for 18 judges. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
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The before-and-after design also cannot distinguish the effects
of innovations from "secular drift," a general long-term trend.
Appellate caseloads increased regularly for several decades until
the mid-1980's, prompting courts to dispose of more appeals irrespective of any procedural or personnel changes. Thus, a
before-and-after study usually shows that an innovation works. 17
Researchers often compare one measure taken before the innovation to a different measure taken afterwards. For example, a
study of summary procedures in the Rhode Island Supreme
Court concluded that new summary procedures are efficient
largely because the average delay in cases subjected to the procedures was less than the delay for all criminal cases in the
prior year. 18 A frequent mistake is to measure delay in cases
filed before and after an innovation, but to exclude cases still
pending at the time researchers wish to conclude the research.
The pending cases are predominately those filed after the innovations and those with the longest delay, so the sample of cases
for the "after" period is skewed because it includes only the
cases with less delay. 19
A final problem is that the innovation may not have an immediate impact because it may take some time for judges and staff
to overcome the inertia of the old standard operating procedures
and to iron out the bugs in the new procedures. 20 Therefore, the
usual procedure of only measuring output soon after the experiment is initiated is not sufficient.
2. Cross-section studies- A second unacceptable design is
the cross-section survey. For instance, a researcher might study
THE COURTS, THE ARIZONA COURTS: 1985 CASELOAD, FINANCIAL, AND PERSONNEL REPORT
(1985).
17. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, THE APPELLATE PROCESS AND STAFF RESEARCH ATIORNEYS IN
THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT 73-84 (1974). In that study, the researcher concluded that
staff attorneys helped courts increase the number of cases decided, because the number
went up in the year staff attorneys were introduced. Id.
18. See Olson & Chapper, Screening and Tracking Criminal Appeals: The Rhode
Island Experience, 8 JusT. Svs. J. 20 (1983). The cases subjected to summary procedures
were the more routine cases, and they were given abbreviated briefing schedules. The
study did not give the time to disposition for all criminal appeals in the "after" period. A
similar problem was encountered in a study conducted by Chapper and Hanson. See
Chapper & Hanson, Expedited Procedures for Appellate Courts: Evidence from California's Third District Court of Appeal, 42 Mo. L. REV. 696 (1983). The study found that
delay in cases subjected to a procedure that gave them priority in scheduling was less
than a similar group of cases decided the year before but not given scheduling priority.
Id. at 720. Again, this delay reduction may well have been at the expense of other appeals, but no evidence on that point was presented.
19. E.g., A. AIKMAN, M. ELSNER & F. MILLER, supra note 10, at 92, 95-96.
20. Casper & Brereton, Evaluating Criminal Justice Reforms, 18 LAW & Soc'v REv.
121, 132, 138-42 (1984).
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several courts, comparing output volume with characteristics of
the courts. This type of research is unacceptable for several reasons. First, the sample size-the number of units studied-is
often too small to justify conclusions. 21 A fifty-state sample
would not be sufficient for a study of appellate courts, especially
because a researcher should include a large number of variables
to control for other differences between the states. 22 Second, the
available variables may not capture some major differences between courts, causing misleading results. 23 Third, causal interpretation is often impossible.· Because the data are taken at one
point in time, correlations can result because the dependent
variable (e.g., decisions per judge) affects the independent variables (factors that are thought to affect decisions per judge). A
finding that courts with more staff attorneys are more productive, for example, cannot justify a conclusion that the larger staff
enhances productivity; a likely alternative interpretation is that
courts with high caseloads (and thus more decisions) per judge
try to relieve workload pressures by hiring more staff. 2 •
Numerous court studies use the case as the unit of analysis. 25
This strategy overcomes the problem of small sample size, but
the research usually fails because almost all relationships between the dependent variable (e.g., decision output or delay),
and procedural features of the cases are causally ambiguous. A
finding that cases decided without published opinion are decided more quickly than other cases, for example, does not mean
that the procedure speeds opinions; more likely, cases selected
21. Court research provides numerous examples of cross-section studies that cannot
provide meaningful information because they use ludicrously small samples, often outnumbered by the number of variables studied. See, e.g., Hanson & Chapper, What Does
Sentencing Reform Do to Criminal Appeals?, 72 JUDICATURE 50 (1988) (three appellate
courts); Martin & Prescott, The Magnitude and Sources of Delay in Ten State Appellate Courts, 6 JusT. SYS. J. 305 (1981). For examples at the trial level, see T. CHURCH, A.
CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JusTICE DELAYED (1978) (five to 21 courts); S. FLANDERS, CASE
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977) (six
courts).
22.

For example, see the variables listed in Table 1.

23. This is illustrated by the high significance of the state effects (state dummy variables) in the regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3. The state effects represent factors
that differ between states but are not captured by the independent variables entered
· into the regression.
24. For a description of this problem, see J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, APPELLATE
COURT DELAY: STRUCTURAL RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF VOLUME AND DELAY 50-51
(1981).
25.

See, e.g., id. at 42-49.
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for nonpublished opinions are less complex and thus are
processed more quickly. 28

B.

Acceptable Research Designs

Social science research texts consider three research designs, if
properly executed, to be acceptable when studying social causation. 27 These designs are the pure experiment, the single time
series, and the multiple time series. Researchers mitigate causal
ambiguity either by studying the impact of an innovation over
several years or by applying the innovation to a randomly selected group of courts or cases.
1. Pure random experiment- The preferred research design
for causal analysis is the pure experiment, where subjects (e.g.,
cases or courts) are divided randomly into control and experimental groups. The "experiment" is applied to the experimental
group, and the output measure (e.g., delay or number of decisions) is compared to that in the control group. The strength of
this design is based on the assumptions that the two groups differ systematically in only one respect, the application of the experiment, and that all other differences are random. The Federal
Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts have
been able to estimate the effectiveness of appellate settlement
conferences by randomly assigning some cases to the conference
procedure and other cases to a control group. 28 But successful
experimental studies in courts are extremely rare because of
26. A similar problem is involved in studies finding that fast-track procedures, which
give scheduling priority to less complex appeals, result in quicker decisions in those appeals. Such findings cannot support the conclusions that the procedures reduced delay in
the courts because the speedier decisions may be at the expense of greater delay in other
decisions. See Chapper & Hanson, supra note 18, at 706-70; Olson & Chapper, supra
note 18, at 24-28.
27. See generally D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 13-24; T. CooK & D.
CAMPBELL, supra note 7; Lempert, supra note 7, at 127-32; Lind, Shapard & Cecil, supra
note 7, at 91-96, 107-10.
28. J. GOLDMAN, AN EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 8-11 (1977) (Federal Judicial Center publication); A.
PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, A REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN 31-42
(1983) (Federal Judicial Center publication); D. STEELMAN & J. GOLDMAN, THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: EXPERIMENTING WITH APPELLATE JUSTICE 55-58 (1986) (National
Center for State Courts Publication). These studies, however, suffer from the problem
that the results are peculiar to the courts studied, and judges cannot assume that settlement conferences in their courts will produce similar results. Also, the conclusions
reached can depend on the particular measure of "success" used. Compare J. GOLDMAN,
supra, at 36-46, with Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment
in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1209, 1221-22 (1978).
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many practical problems. Judges may be reluctant to permit researchers to dictate court operations to the extent required to
ensure random assignment. The experiments require substantial
sample sizes (typically several hundred, depending on the magnitude of the impact found), so a true experiment may require
several years.
By far, the most important problem with pure experiments in
court research is that the experimental and control groups may
be treated differently in ways other than the "experimental"
treatment, thus contaminating the results. Researchers can use
the experimental design to determine whether appellate settlement conferences foster more settlements because the conferences take place in the early stages of case processing, and the
settlement decisions are made by attorneys, not by the court. If
aspects of court processing are controlled by judges or court
staff, a true experiment cannot be used to evaluate them because
the researcher cannot determine whether the judges or court
staff decide independently of the "experimental" procedure. 29
For example, studying the impact of staff attorneys by randomly
assigning some cases to staff and others to a control group would
not be helpful because judges may give staff cases priority or
otherwise treat these cases differently from the control cases. It
would be unrealistic to expect judges to ignore the existence of
the experiment. This problem could be avoided if the court,
rather than the case, is the unit of analysis, but that would require an enormous research effort, using hundreds of courts with
varying procedures randomly assigned to them.
2. Long time series- The other generally accepted research
designs for the social science exploration of causation are based
on time differences between variables, and they rely heavily on
econometric techniques. A change in court operations in one
year can cause, but cannot be caused by, changes in the dependent variable-in the present research, decision output-in subsequent years. The time-series design, for example, could study
whether output increases significantly in the years after staff attorneys were hired. This design differs from the discredited
before-and-after design mainly because the data are obtained for
enough time periods to help control for the impact of factors
other than the evaluated change. The rule of thumb is that
29. For example, the experimental design cannot be used to determine whether settlement conferences reduce delay because other procedural hurdles and/or the priorities
involved in scheduling conference cases may affect the scheduling of the nonconference
cases. See A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, supra note 28, at 49-59; D. STEELMAN & J. GOLDMAN,
supra note 28, at 55-91.
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time-series tests require data from at least fifty time periods. 30
Such large data sets are rarely available for court studies. 31
3. Multiple time-series design- The final acceptable design,
and the design used here, is the multiple time-series analysis,
which uses data from many courts over a period of several years.
This has long been considered among the best social science research designs. 32 Nevertheless, the design is seldom used for
court studies, probably because it is more the province of economists than of the disciplines whose members generally study
courts.
In the present study, the application of the multiple time-series design involves data for forty-four state appellate court systems over a time span of seventeen years for most. The variables
include measures of decision output and of the changes being
evaluated. In this way, the time series for the different court systems, each of which is not long enough for proper analysis, can
be combined into a regression with a large sample size. 33
The only multiple time-series study of appellate court decision
output-in fact, the only prior study of state appellate procedures other than settlement conferences that uses an acceptable
research design-was conducted more than half a century ago.
In this excellent, large-scale project at the University of Michigan Law School, the authors counted opinions published in most
states during the first three decades of the century and evaluated efficiency measures, such as adding lawyer staff and deciding cases without opinion, by determining whether opinion output increased in the years after a particular measure was
adopted by the various courts. 34 The authors of that work, however, did not have the statistical techniques or computing power
to control for the impact of other changes. The present study
attempts to modernize that seminal project.
30.
31.

T. CooK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 7, at 228.
For an example of a study with sufficient time series data, see Garner, Delay

Reduction in the Federal Courts: Rule 50(b) and the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
3 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 229 (1987).
32. Campbell and Stanley, two highly regarded methodologists, consider this "an excellent quasi-experimental design, perhaps the best of the more feasible designs." D.
CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 57; see also T. CooK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note
7, at 214-18. Lempert considers this design to be the "design par excellence" for impact
research. Lempert, supra note 7, at 130.
33. The statistical methodology used is further described in Part II.
34. Curran & Sunderland, The Organization and Operation of Courts of Review: An

Examination of the Various Methods Employed to Increase the Operating Capacity
and Efficiency of Appellate Courts, in THIRD REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN 52 (1933).
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RESEARCH PROCEDURES

This Section describes the research procedures applied to the
multiple time-series model. The section pays particular attention to the statistical methods and the construction of
variables. 36
A. Statistical Methods

The present research uses a production function model and a
fixed effects regression. Both are basic, routine statistical procedures that have been used and refined for several decades.
The production function has long been considered to be the
best procedure for analyzing the volume of output in an organization. The production function gives the amount of output that
can be produced by a given combination of labor and other inputs.36 It assumes that output increases at a decreasing rate:
that each additional unit of labor, for example, will cause the
output to increase, but the rate of increase will get smaller unless all other inputs increase proportionately. For example, applying this notion to appellate courts, one would not expect that
simply adding more judges would result in a corresponding increase in appeals decided, because the pool of cases to be decided, the court's staff, and other inputs have not increased.
Without a production function model, the researcher would
make the unrealistic assumption that, for example, ten percent
more judges will decide ten percent more cases, even if no more
cases were filed or no more staff attorneys or law clerks were
hired.
For the regression analysis, we have used the "fixed-effects"
model, which includes dummy variables for each state (dummy
variables are either zero or one; here, the dummy variable for a
35. For more detail concerning the analyses and data used, see T. Marvell & C.
Moody, State Appellate Court Adaptation to Caseload Growth (July 1986) (unpublished
report; National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Washington, D.C.); Responses to
Caseload Growth, supra note 3. The full data set is available from the authors or from
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
36. The research uses the most common form of production function, the CobbDouglas function, which has been widely used for half a century. For more detailed descriptions of the Cobb-Douglas function, see M. INTRILIGATOR, ECONOMETRIC MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 262-80, 288-92 (1978); A. WALTERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMETRICS 269-339 (1970). For the specific application of the Cobb-Douglas function
to the present research (including the mathematical functions) and more detail concerning the analysis and data used, see T. Marvell & C. Moody, supra note 35, at ch. 2, 1-8.
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state is one for observations pertaining to the state, and zero
otherwise). This, again, is standard statistical procedure. 37

B.

Unit of Analysis

State appellate court operations and productivity are best analyzed at the level of the entire appellate system, rather than at
the level of an individual court, because state appellate structures vary. 38 In 1968, the initial year of the research, only seventeen of the forty-four states studied had intermediate appellate
courts (IAC's). By 1984, they existed in thirty-one of the states.
IAC jurisdiction differs greatly. In some states, IAC's receive virtually all initial appeals; in others, a sizeable portion of the appeals are routed directly to the state supreme court. IAC's in the
former states, of course, are usually much larger than those in
the latter states. A few states, moreover, have two IAC's with
different subject-matter jurisdiction. Finally, the division of appellate jurisdiction changed substantially during the period of
37. See R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS
252-61 (1981); Moody & Marvell, Appellate and Trial Court Caseload Growth: A Pooled
Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis, 3 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143, 150-52 (1987)
[hereinafter Cross-Section Analysis]. The multiple time-series design, it should be
noted, is also called the time-series cross-section design, and the fixed-effects model is
also called the "least squares dummy variable" or the "covariance" model. The fixedeffects model also includes separate dummies for each year; these were eliminated because, as a group, they were not significant. See R. PINDYCK & D. RuBINFELD, supra, at
255. This means that it is very likely that there are nationwide factors affecting appellate
decision output that are not represented by the independent variables entered in the
analysis.
As a time-series analysis, this research occasionally encountered autocorrelation
problems that were corrected using the normal procedure. R. PINDYCK & D. RuBINFELD,
supra, at 258-61. The regression in Table 2 and the supreme court analysis in Table 3
had Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.32 and 1.66, respectively, before correction (values below 1.78 indicate possible autocorrelation problems). The Breusch-Pagan test uncovered
a slight heteroskedasticity problem (the test looked at whether variance is related to
court size and found variance is greater in small states), which was eliminated by weighting the regression by the square root of population. Tests for multicollinearity (independent variables highly correlated) revealed a possible problem with respect to the number
of filings for the current year and the prior year. That is, the F-Ratios for these variables
given in Tables 2 and 3 may be too low, and the apportionment of the coefficient between the two may be slightly off. The only other multicollinearity is between state dummies (and between the dummies and the intercept), which is not relevant to the results
here. Application of the Granger-Sims test found no simultaneity (independent variable
causing independent variables), except for a possible problem with respect to the number
of judges, discussed infra note 58. For a more complete and technical analysis of the
application of the fixed-effects model to the present research, see T. Marvell & C.
Moody, supra note 35, at ch. 2, 4-9.
38. The variations are described in Marvell, supra note 5, at 90-97.
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this study; most states have created or greatly expanded IAC's
since 1968.
These changes render trends in individual courts misleading
because the content of their caseloads change. When a state
transfers jurisdiction to an IAC from a supreme court, the supreme court typically retains the more difficult appeals and the
more time-consuming lawmaking function of appellate courts,
while the IAC concentrates on error correction. Hence, the
caseload and procedure of a supreme court often cannot be compared to those of earlier years or to those of supreme courts in
other states. IAC operations are more comparable because all
IAC's concentrate on error correction, but states differ concerning how many of the difficult error-correcting cases are retained
in the supreme court.
By focusing on the whole appellate system, one can avoid the
troubles caused by shifting jurisdiction. 39 Taken at the appellate
level, the variables are derived by adding figures from the supreme courts and the IAC's in each state. For example, the number of decisions per judge is the sum of supreme court and IAC
decisions divided by the sum of supreme court and IAC judges,
and the percentage of opinions that are unpublished is the total
number of unpublished opinions in the two court levels divided
by the total number of opinions.
As discussed later, the study also analyzed separately three
different categories of appellate systems: (1) supreme cour~ in
states without IAC's; (2) appellate systems that have large
IAC's-those taking at least eighty percent of the appeals in the
state; and (3) mid-range states, with IAC's deciding less than
eighty percent of all appeals. Variable means presented in Table
1 show that there are some major differences among these three
types of appellate systems. 40

39. See infra note 54 concerning controls when there are changes in the jurisdiction
of the overall state appellate system, as opposed to changes in the jurisdiction of individual courts.
40. See infra text accompanying note 47. Table 1, however, exaggerates the differences. Because many states created IAC's, data for supreme courts alone tend to be for
earlier years in the study, when decisions per judge were lower and efficiency measures
were less drastic. The same applies to the relationship between mid-range appellate systems and states with large IAC's.
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The Dependent Variable: Number of Appeals Decided
Per Judge·

The two major types of variables in a regression analysis are
the dependent and independent variables. Each regression has
one dependent variable, placed on the left side of the equation.
The independent variables, on the right side of the equation, are
assumed to "cause" changes in the dependent variable. 0 The
dependent variable in this study is the number of appeals decided per judge during a year, and the following paragraphs define the two elements of this term.
1. Decisions- Appeals "decided" are those resolved on the
merits-with or without written opinion. 42 "Decisions" do not
include denials of writs or certiorari petitions, appeals withdrawn or dismissed for lack of progress, determinations made on
procedural motions, or rehearing petitions. "Decisions" do include, however, cases dismissed by written opinion, disciplinary
cases given full review, appeals summarily decided on the merits
(e.g;, cases resolved without briefs), and certiorari petitions or
other discretionary writs granted and then considered in the
manner of ordinary appeals. 43
41. For detailed information about the variables and the sources of data, see T. MARVELL & C. MOODY, supra note 35, at chs. 6-12.
The major sources of data are state court administrative offices, unpublished reports
prepared by the courts, and the large body of secondary literature on the topic, see supra
note 5. Especially useful were several nationwide surveys of appellate court operations,
including W. KRAMER, COMPARATIVE OUTLINE OF BASIC APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE AND
PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983), and Council of Chief Judges of Cts. of Appeals, Chief Judges as Administrators: A Survey (Apr. 1984) (unpublished report) (Appellate Judges Conference of the Arn. Bar Ass'n). In several states, where all opinions are
published, decision data were obtained by counting opinions. Court clerks were interviewed in all states studied, as well as staff attorneys or judges in most states. The completed data were sent to the clerks for comments.
42. The number of decisions for most courts is the number of cases decided, but, for
some, it is the number of opinions or orders deciding cases. The latter measure excludes
cases consolidated for decision in one opinion (which amount to approximately five to
ten percent of all appeals decided). The decision measure never varies within a state;
thus, in the regression analysis, the state dummy variables control for the difference in
methods of counting decisions.
43. The composition of appeals probably varies greatly between states; thus, the difficulty of appeals may vary, and the number of appeals decided may not be comparable
between states. The regression analysis, however, controls for such differences by entering state dummy variables. There is no reason to believe that the types of appeals in
state courts have changed appreciably during the relatively short period of this study. If
there were nationwide changes, they would be controlled for by the year dummies (which
would then become significant). The nationwide portion of criminal appeals, which probably take less time than civil appeals, has changed little since the rnid-1960's, but the
portion of criminal appeals did vary in individual states. See BUREAU OF JusT. STATISTICS,
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2. Judges- The "number of judges" is the number of sitting, full-time appellate judges. It excludes vacancies but includes judges temporarily absent due to illness or recusal. It excludes senior or retired judges, unless they sit full-time and are
regular judges for all practical purposes. 44
III.

RESULTS

The analysis evaluates the effectiveness of changes that courts
have adopted to increase decision output, emphasizing those
that the literature has recommended as effective answers to
caseload problems. 45 In addition, the analysis includes several
control variables to represent changes, other than efficiency
measures, that may affect output. In all, the analysis contains
nineteen independent variables (not including the state effects)
that are organized into eight categories below. 46 The variable
supra note 1, at 2. We have information concerning the number of criminal cases for
most states in the analysis; when the percentage of criminal cases was entered in the
regression analysis, the variable was far from significant. As discussed infra note 54, the
analysis controls for changes in caseload compensation when appellate jurisdiction
changes.
44. The major sources of information about judges were state court annual reports,
state judicial directories and biographies, and the lists of judges printed in West Publishing Company state reporters.
45. For examples of the enormous body of literature available on this topic, see supra
note 5. The analysis includes virtually all major changes appellate courts have made to
increase output (excluding technological changes such as word-processing equipment).
One exception is the Washington Court of Appeals motion on the merits procedure,
under which staff attorneys make initial decisions in many cases, with further review by
the judges available. With rare exceptions, cases were not decided under this program
until 1985. See Green & Keyes, Motion on the Merits: An Effective Response to Appel·
late Congestion and Delay, 70 JUDICATURE 168 (1986). Another possible exception is the
use of specialized panels for criminal cases (in New Jersey during 1985) or for workers'
compensation cases (Arizona since 1969 and Illinois since 1985). Only one of these
changes occurred during the time period studied here. Another procedure designed to
help appellate courts deal with rising caseloads is the preargument settlement conference; this was not included in the study because the primary aim of such conferences is
to reduce the volume of cases submitted to the judges, not to increase decision output.
"Screening" and "fast-track" procedures are not included as variables because they do
not involve efficiency measures distinct from the variables that are included; rather, they
are procedures for determining which cases are subjected to the various efficiency measures. Screening, as the name implies, involves decisions by the court as to which cases
are argued, decided with opinion, or the like. Fast-track procedures apply certain efficiency measures in return for scheduling priority.
46. For background information, see Responses to Caseload Growth, supra note 3.
For descriptions of the extent of changes made by each state studied, see T. MARVELL &
C. Mooov, supra note 35, at Pt. IV, and Responses to Caseload Growth, supra note 3.
This Article does not fully describe the numerous arguments as to why these various
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means are given in Table 1. 47 Table 2 presents the results of the
estimation for the full sample, and Table 3 presents the results
for three separate categories of states. 48 The three are discussed
separately because statistical tests revealed significant differences among the production functions for the different categories of states. 49 However, because the differences are not major
and do not affect most variables, discussion will concentrate on
full analysis in Table 2, which has more observations and, therefore, more precise results.

changes may or may not add to court productivity. For sources discussing this point, see
supra note 5.
47. As indicated in Table 2, several variables were entered in the analysis in logged
form. The mean of the (natural) log of these variables (for all states, states without
IAC's, mid-range states, and states with large IAC's) is: decisions per judge (4.07, 3.79,
4.06, 4.50); filings per judge (4.42, 4.19, 4.34, 4.82); number of judges (2.48, 1.71, 2.83,
3.32); staff attorneys per judge (.21, .15, .16, .42); law clerks per judge (.79, .76, .76, .87).
For the number of staff attorneys and law clerks per judge, one is added to the variables
before taking the log because it is impossible to take the log of zero, and adding one sets
the lower limit of the logged variable at zero.
48. See supra text accompanying note 40. The 80% level was selected because it is a
natural break: States did not move through that level without jurisdiction changes.
These regressions, as we previously explained, encompass whole appellate systems. The
results of the regression for states with large IAC's are nearly the same as the results for
the IAC's alone (that is, without including the supreme court judges, decisions, and so
on). A similar comparison for mid-range states is not feasible because the jurisdictions of
the supreme courts and IAC's shift widely and because, in some states, total filings, the
most important variable, cannot be meaningfully apportioned to either court level.
49. The Chow test was used to determine whether the results for each of the three
types of appellate systems are significantly different from the remainder of the courts.
See R. PINDYCK & D. RuBINFELD, supra note 37, at 123-26. Under the Chow procedure
the analysis represented in Table 2 was conducted three times, each testing 1) whether
the results for states with one type of appellate system are significantly different from
the results for the remaining states with respect to each of the variables; and 2) whether
the coefficients as a group are significantly different (excluding the IAC percentage variable, which defines the groups of states). The latter test showed significant differences,
although the differences were not greatly significant, for all three types of court systems.
The F-Ratios are 2.62 for supreme courts in states without IAC's, 1.96 for mid-range
appellate systems, and 1.83 for states with large IAC's.
With respect to individual variables, significant differences (to the .05 level) were
found for the number of judges (mid-range and large IAC's), extra judges (supreme
courts without IAC's and mid-range systems), intermediate court percent (mid-range
and large IAC's), panel size (mid-range IAC's), argument length (supreme courts), and
law clerks (supreme courts).
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Variable Means

Variable

All States
MidStates with- range
out States
IAC

States
with
large
IACs

decisions per judge

58.56

44.26

57.97

90.02

filings per judge

83.10

66.02

123.97

prior year filings per judge

76.71

61.56

76.71
70.11

number of judges
extra judges (dummy)

11.94

16.95

27.66

.26

5.53
.23

.19

.40

percent new judges

11.45

9.57

14.18

10.60

.23

.16

.52

1.20
22.04
.44

1.14
9.35
.36

.17
1.14

1.39

22.89
.41

39.94
.64

.15

.10

.15

.30

8.58

9.41

4.74

11.06

42.61

61.46

90.57

4.15
.65

3.53
.79

.30
58.22

.19

staff attorneys per judge
law clerks per judge
percent unpublished opinions
15% memo opinions (dummy)
50% memo opinions (dummy)
percent decided without opinions
intermediate court percent
average panel size
15% w/o oral argument (dummy)

4.30
.59

0
4.86
.42

50% w/o oral argument (dummy)

.19

.10

59.58

oral argument length (minutes)
10% summary decisions (dummy)

.07

64.23
.12

jurisdiction change (dummy)

.05

0

115.58

.07

55.16
.02

.09

.05

change in procedure for docketing
1.92
1.83
2.27
1.74
filings
The regression includes forty-four states, with five to seventeen years
for each. 110 Missing data for some independent variables, especially filings, preclude the use of all observations with data for decision output.
Still, all but four states have complete data for at least ten years in the
main analysis (Table 2). In the analysis of the three appellate system
types (Table 3), nearly half the states have time series of under ten
years because jurisdiction changes caused many states to be shifted
from one category to another. 111 The results are robust in that they do
not change substantially when using different variable specifications or
50. The District of Columbia is counted as a state. The states not included in the
analysis are Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Decision data from 1968 to 1984 were obtained for 38 of the 44 states, and decision
data back to at least 1972 were obtained for the remaining six states.
51. States were deleted from these analyses if they had less than five years of data.
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regression models. 02 It is important to note that the state dummies in
all regressions are highly significant, which suggests that productivity
differs greatly between state appellate systems (but not over time
within statesu) for reasons not represented by other variables in the
analysis. One possible reason might be a disparity in how hard judges
work.
The following sections briefly describe the independent variablesH
52. The results for different types of analysis are given in T. Marvell & C. Moody,
supra note 35, at chs. 14-15. That study, however, differs from the present one in that it

does not include four states added afterwards, does not distinguish between staff attorneys and law clerks, does not include current-year filings, and does not correct for heteroskedasticity. Of particular importance is the fact that the results are very similar when
using a linear regression, without using logged variables. Although this procedure is more
intuitively appealing to the layperson, it is not the best procedure for reasons given in
Part IIA. The results of this linear regression are:
Independent Variable

Coefficient T-ratio

filings per judge

.086

3.07

prior year filing per judge

.381

12.41

extra judges (dummy)

4.004

2.23

percent new judges

-.016

.70

staff attorneys per judge

3.771

1.14

law clerks per judge

1.594

.93

percent unpublished opinions

.181

3.81

15% memo opinions (dummy)

.571

.39

50% memo opinions (dummy)

3.095

1.58

percent decided without opinions

.327

4.92

intermediate court percent

.246

5.78

1.004

1.22

.004

.00

6.550

3.92

oral argument length

.094

1.51

10% summary decisions (dummy)

.634

.24

average panel size
15% w/o oral argument (dummy)
50% oral argument (dummy)

jurisdiction change (dummy)
change in procedure for docketing filings

-2.630

.82

.083

3.76

Number of observations, 541; degrees of freedom, 479; F-Ratio, 791; Durbin-Watson
statistic, 2.08 (1.64 before correction); F-Ratio for state dummies, 32.00.
C

53. See supra note 37 for a discussion of year dummies.
54. Besides the variables of interest, the regression includes several "nuisance" variables that control for jurisdiction changes and changes in procedures for counting appeals. During the period of the study, new laws in six states provided for direct appeal to
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and discuss the results presented in Tables 2 and 3. 55
1. Filings- The "raw material" input is measured by two variables, the number of appeals filed per judge for the current year and
for the prior year. This input includes a lagged variable because the
typical court takes approximately a year to decide cases. The current
year variable is included because a larger backlog of pending cases may
prompt judges to expand output. Filings are appeals of right and, with
rare exceptions, do not include writs and certiorari petitions, which are
ordinarily dismissed without decision on the merits. 56
The results show a very strong relationship between filings, especially the previous year's filings, and decision output. Ten percent
more filings will lead to approximately six percent more decisions, 57
even if the court makes none of the other changes studied. In other
words, courts hand down more decisions simply because more cases are
filed. Similar results occur in all three types of court systems.
appellate courts from limited jurisdiction courts (previously, these appeals went to general jurisdiction trial courts). The new laws generally cover criminal misdemeanors and
small civil cases. Because these cases are probably less complex than most appeals, their
addition can cause total productivity to rise. The changes occurred when intermediate
appellate courts were created or expanded. Thus, analysis without this control variable
would overstate the impact of IAC's on productivity.
The second nuisance variable controls for changes in methods of counting appeals
filed. Some courts count appeals when the notice of appeal is filed, while others count
them when the record arrives. The latter system reduces the volume of appeals because
many cases are dropped between notice of appeal and record completion. Six of the
states studied adopted the first counting system during the study period, artificially increasing filings. To control for this, the analysis includes an interaction variable-filings
per judge logged times a dummy variable indicating the type of docketing (0 = when the
record arrives; 1 = at notice of appeal).
55. Readers not familiar with statistical analysis should note that the findings are, to
varying degrees, imprecise. It is likely that the impact of some changes varies between
courts, and the results here estimate the average impact. In general, a finding that a
change shows no statistically significant impact on decision output indicates that it is
unlikely that the change has more than slight impact in any courts, although this conclusion is less clear when the degrees of freedom are less (e.g., in Table 3). When a relationship is significant, the coefficient indicates the midpoint of a range in which the actual
results are likely to fall. This range is larger when the T-Ratio is smaller. For example,
the range (95% confidence interval) for law clerks in Table 1 is between .009 and .207 (or
plus or minus 92% of the .108 coefficient), indicating that the findings are very imprecise. In contrast, the range for prior year filings per judge is .363 to .525, a spread of plus
or minus 18%. The differences between results in Table 2 and Table 3 are due largely to
the general impreciseness of the findings, especially those in Table 3. It would be risky to
attribute the different results for different court systems (in Table 3) to actual differences between courts unless there are strong reasons for believing that such relationships
exist.
56. The filing data were obtained from a Bureau of Justice Statistics study. See BuREAU OF JusT. STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 4-6.
57. In statistical terms, the "elasticity" is .6. Elasticity is the same as the coefficient
when both variables are logged. More exactly, the elasticity for filings is the sum of the
value for the current and prior year (.180 + .444 = .624).
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2. Judges- Three variables pertain to judges. First, the number of
appellate judges is a variable that indicates returns to scale-that is,
whether adding more judges produces a corresponding increase in output. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero, then the returns to scale are significantly different from unitary. Taken overall, as
shown in Table 2, there are no positive or negative returns to scale, 118
but the result differs among court systems (Table 3). For states without IAC's, there are decreasing returns to scale, although at a low significance level. Here, a one hundred percent increase in supreme court
judges, legal staff, and filings will probably result in less than a one
hundred percent increase in output. This result makes intuitive sense:
the need for all judges to participate in important decisions at the top
level poses greater problems than found in other courts. 119
Second, the number-of-extra-judges variable refers to the temporary
assignment of trial judges or retired judges to supplement regular judicial capacity. 6 ° Courts in most states used this practice at one time or
another, but the courts seldom used extra judges to increase the effective number of judges by more than ten percent. Because statistics on
the precise number of extra judges are not always available, a dummy
variable 61 signifies whether extra judges were used.
58. Applications of the Granger-Sims test found a possible simultaneity (reverse causation) problem with respect to the number of judges. That is, if a state appellate system
produces more (less) decisions per judge in a particular year, the state government may
be more (less) reluctant to increase the number of judges that year. For a general discussion of this type of problem, see Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by
Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods, 37 ECONOMETRICA 424 (1969). In
practice, such a relationship is unlikely. First, the simultaneity effect is not highly significant (T-Ratio = 2.30, just above 1.96, which indicates significance to the .95 level), and
with 16 tests for the different independent variables, one would expect that, just by
chance, one would produce significant results. Second, common sense suggests that the
causal relationship is improbable. Legislatures may well be less likely to create new appellate judgeships if the courts are able to handle the current caseload by increasing
productivity, but the impact would be lagged rather than simultaneous. There is considerable time between a change in productivity and any impact on the number of judges,
because it takes a while for legislatures to react to the changes, for the law to reach its
effective date, and for new judges to be appointed or elected.
59. See Dethmers, Delay in State Courts of Last Resort, 328 ANNALS 153, 158 (1960).
60. This should be distinguished from the more common practice of using trial and
retired judges to fill in when regular judges are temporarily unavailable.
61. Dummy variables are either zero or one. In this situation, the variable is zero if
the appellate system does not use extra judges in a particular year, and one if it does.
The coefficient of the dummy variable is determined solely by within-state changes. For
the extra-judge dummy variable, there were 18 such changes in the analysis for Table 2,
and, in Table 3 there were 10 changes for states without IAC's and seven for mid-range
states. There was only one change for states with large IAC's, so the results are particularly uncertain. Of the 44 states in the analysis, 41 have data on the judge equivalents
added by using extra judges. In an analysis (comparable to that in Table 2) with just
these states, the coefficient (elasticity) of the extra judge variable is .66 (T-Ratio = 3.34).
Because the coefficient is less than one, this suggests that extra judges do not contribute
as much as regular judges to decision output for a given amount of judge time.
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Table 2. Regression Analysis of All States
Dependent Variable: decisions per judge (logged)
Independent Variable
Coefficient T-ratio
filings per judge (logged)
.1808
4.38
prior year filings per judge (logged)
.4448
10.87
judges (logged)
-.018
.37
.059C
extra judges (dummy)
2.50
-.00Q7C
percent new judges
2.39
staff attorneys per judge (logged)
-.001
.01
.108C
law clerks per judge (logged)
2.15
percent unpublished opinions
4.18
.00268
15% memo opinions (dummy)
.016
.82
.045d
50% memo opinions (dummy)
1.77
percent without opinions
.0040 8
4.87
intermediate court percent
.0028 8
4.10
average panel size
.005
.43
.04od
15% w/o oral argument (dummy)
1.82
50% w/o oral argument (dummy)
.036
1.55
oral argument length
.001
.91
10% summary decisions (dummy)
.000
.01
juris. change (dummy)
.042
.95
.015c
2.02
change in procedure for docketing filings
Observations
541
Degrees of freedom
478
F Ratio
2838
DW
2.04
F Ratio for state dummies
16.1
Notes: a - significant to the .0001 level; b - to the .01 level; c to the .05 level; d - to the .10 level.

Table :t
Independent Variable

filings per judge (logged)
prior year filings per judge (logged)
judges (logged)
extra judges (dummy)
percent new judges
staff attorneys per judge (logged)
law clerks per judge (logged)
percent unpublished opinions
15% memo opinions (dummy)
50% memo opinions (dummy)
percent decided without opinions
intermediate court percent
average panel size
15% w/o oral argument (dummy)
50% w/o oral argument (dummy)
oral argument length
10% sumary dee. (dummy)
juris. change (dummy)
change docketing filings
Number of observations
Degrees of freedom
F Ratio
Durbin Watson statistic
F Ratio for state dummies

Regression Analysis, Different Types of Appellate Systems
Dependent Variable: decisions per judge (logged)
Coefficients (and T-Ratios)
Supreme Courts
Mid-Range
(states without IACs)
Appellate Systems
.148c
(4.14)
(2.06)
.3158
(4.91)
(6.09)
.4258
.429d
-.211
(1.71)
-.076
(.74)
.146b
(.15)
(3.71)
.005
-.0009d
(1.14)
(1.66)
-.0008
-.036
(.40)
(.94)
.135
.222c
(2.29)
.053
(.75)
.007la
(.19)
(4.52)
.0002
(.51)
(.46)
-.024
.015
(1.12)
-.035
(.43)
.038
.0033d
(1.85)
(3.00)
.0063b
(1.32)
.0015
(1.26)
-.026
(.54)
.016
.121 b
(.36)
(3.04)
-.014
.240b
(2.71)
(.07)
.003
-.001
(1.21)
(.38)
.000
-.236c
(2.15)
-.019
(.42)
-.026
(.35)
-.141d
(1.76)
.035c
(1.99)

1.96
10.87

Notes: a - significant to the .0001 level; b - to the .01 level; c - to the .05 level; d - to the .IO level.

States with
Large IACs
.21:ih
(2.70)
(4.92)
.4268
(.70)
-.056
(1.47)
.06:l
(.51)
-.ooo:i
.244c
(2.lS)
(J.:l4)
.17:l
(1.18)
.0012
.009
.0S8
.0017
.009:lc
.01>:f
.020
.027
.00:l
.J06C
-.lfi7c
.ornd
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The use of extra judges is significant in the overall analysis (Table 2). In the disaggregated analyses, however, it is significant
only in states without IAC's, possibly because in these states,
the use of temporary judges provides a greater proportional addition to existing judicial resources.
Third, the rate of judge turnover is expressed by the percentage of judges who are new to the court in the year studied. 62
This variable was included because new judges may be less productive than experienced judges. The percent-new-judges variable has a significant negative impact on productivity, as expected, but the magnitude is very small.
3. Legal staff- The legal staff consists of staff attorneys and
the judges' personal law clerks. The former work for the whole
court, and the latter work for individual judges.63 Here, as elsewhere, the variables are for the whole appellate system; law
clerks per judge, for example, are the total number of appellate
law clerks in the state divided by the total number of judges on
the supreme court and IAC (Table 2).
Adding more staff attorneys and law clerks has surprisingly
little impact on decisions. For law clerks, the impact is significant in the overall analysis, but the magnitude is small. The coefficient of .108 means that if a second law clerk is given to each
judge, the decision output per judge would increase by only
some ten percent. 64 The nationwide analysis in Table 2 found
that staff attorneys have no impact on decision output. Table 3,
however, suggests that staff attorneys may increase productivity
in large IAC's. Because the significance level is low, this is far
from certain, but it is quite possible that judges in large IAC's
are more likely to delegate decision tasks to the staff.
Although the data provide no explanation for the meager impact of legal staff on productivity, one can speculate that the
62. More precisely, it is the number of new judges in the last month of the prior year
and the first 11 months of the current year, divided by the total number of judges. The
variable is lagged a month because it usually takes at least one month for the work of a
new judge to appear as decision output.
63. Information about attorney aides, more than other variables, came from secondary sources and from interviews with court personnel. In several states, court staff themselves obtained the data from budget statements for the study.
64. This is a very imprecise estimate because the significance level is low. The analysis without logged variables found that law clerks did not have a significant impact. See
supra note 52. A similar result was recently obtained in a regression analysis of United
States Supreme Court productivity; the authors found that adding law clerks had a
slight negatiue impact on opinion output in the period 1948-1985, which they attributed
to the administrative costs of managing a larger staff. Stewart & Heck, Caseloads and
Controuersies: A Different Perspectiue on the "Ouerburdened" U.S. Supreme Court, 12
JusT. Svs. J. 370, 378-379 (1987).
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tasks performed by the staff often add to the work of the judges.
For example, a major responsibility of the staff is to gather legal
authorities and other information,65 thus adding to the amount
of material for the judges to consider. If this is true, attorney
staff increase the quality, more than the quantity, of decisions.
The present research, of course, does not address issues of
quality.
4. Opinion practices- The analysis includes variables pertaining to three types of opinion practices, all of which can increase productivity because they reduce the amount of time that
judges spend writing opinions. The first is the percentage of
cases decided with unpublished opinions-that is, with opinions
written but not published in the official reports or in the West
regional reports. 66 This is an effective efficiency measure. Reducing opinion publication has a highly significant impact, although
possibly greater in states without IAC's.
The second practice is issuing opinions that are not signed by
the authoring judge. These are typically called per curiam, memorandum, or simply "memo" opinions-the latter term is used
here to refer to all unsigned opinions. The use of memo opinions
represents a crude measure of opinion length. Most are much
shorter than regular signed opinions, but several courts issue
lengthy memo opinions, and a few courts issue very short signed
opinions. Because some courts do not issue statistics on the actual number of memo opinions, their use is expressed in dummy
variables: One signifies whether memo opinions constitute fifteen percent or more of the total number of opinions, and a second signifies whether they constitute at least half the opinions. 67
The analysis found that issuing memo opinions has only a small
impact, slightly significant for one of the variables in Table 2,
but never significant in Table 3. 68 However, the analysis might
65. T.

MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE

88-97 (1978).
66. Information for this variable was usually available from court statistics, and it
was checked against figures supplied by West Publishing Company for the number of
opinions it published for each court in each year. For several states, the West figures
were the only information available concerning the extent of publication.
67. Dummy variables here and elsewhere were "smoothed" in the sense that they
were not changed if the court only temporarily and slightly passed the dividing line.
68. There were 30 within-state changes in the 15% dummy variable in Table 2, and
13 for the 50% dummy variable. Comparable figures for Table 3 are 11 and three for
supreme courts without IAC's, 10 and five for mid-range states, and five and three for
states with large IAC's. Some changes are not included in Table 3 because they occurred
when appellate systems changed categories. Information about the number of memo
opinions was obtained for 37 of the 44 states. In an analysis with only these states, the
ADVERSARY SYSTEM
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have shown a greater impact if a more refined measure of opinion length were available.
The final opinion variable is the percentage of appeals decided
without any opinion. These are decisions on the merits (denials
of discretionary appeals and writs are excluded in the measure
of decisions) that are decided by a simple order giving only the
bare holding. Deciding cases without opinion greatly increases
productivity (Table 2). The results in Table 3 suggest that the
most pronounced impact may occur in mid-range appellate systems, although there is no ready explanation for why this might
be so.
5. Intermediate courts- Because IAC jurisdiction-and
therefore the portion of cases decided by IAC's and supreme
courts-varies greatly, IAC's are measured by the percentage of
appellate system decisions made there. The percentage, of
course, is zero in states without IAC's, and it varies from fifty to
ninety-five percent for nearly all states with IAC's. The IAC
variable is significant for the overall regression (Table 2). 69 This
means that increasing IAC jurisdiction increases the overall productivity of state appellate systems even after controlling for all
the other changes studied here.
6. Panel decisions- With few exceptions, IAC's either have
only three judges or they decide cases in panels of three judges.
Most supreme courts sat in panels of three to five judges at some
time during the study. One would expect that the involvement
of fewer judges in decisions would increase productivity. In the
analysis, the average size of panels is the mean number of judges
deciding cases. If a court decides all cases en bane (i.e., without
using panels), the panel size is considered to be the total number
of judges on the court. The average panel size for states with
IAC's is computed from the panel sizes for the supreme court
and IAC, weighted for the relative decision output of each.
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this research is that
reducing panel size does not increase productivity. 70 A possible
explanation is that the judge assigned to write the opinion does
most of the work on an appeal, and smaller panels do not reduce
percent of cases decided with memo opinions was significantly related to decision output
(coefficient = .0016, T-Ratio = 2.03).
69. This result cannot be compared to those in Table 3 because the extent of IAC
involvement in producing appellate decisions is the criterion for distinguishing the three
types of appellate systems. The results in Table 3, therefore, do not reflect the impact of
major changes in IAC use.
70. These results, like all the findings here, apply only within the range experienced
by the courts studied. The average panel size is almost always limited to the three to
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opinion assignments or, probably, the amount of time required
to write opinions. 71 Furthermore, each concurring judge may
scrutinize the opinion more carefully when the panel is small,
knowing that there are fewer judges who can do so.
7. Oral arguments- Oral arguments can be curtailed by reducing their frequency or their length. The available information permits only rather crude variables for both. The number of
arguments is represented by two dummy variables signifying
whether at least fifteen percent and fifty percent, respectively, of
the cases are decided without argument. The length of arguments is represented by the time limit specified in court rules,
but this only approximates the actual time spent because many
attorneys do not use their allotted time.
Reducing the percentage of cases argued produces a significant impact on productivity, 72 although the results differ somewhat between appellate systems (Table 3). The oral argument
time limits have no discernible impact on productivity.
8. Summary judgment procedures- Summary judgment
procedures, the most radical answer to caseload growth, are similar to such procedures at the trial level. The court or one party
moves to affirm before the parties file their briefs (in some
courts, even before the transcript is filed), and the information
received by the court is usually limited to short memoranda
from the parties. When the appeal is summarily decided, therefore, the court dispenses with most of the appellate process.
These procedures are represented by a dummy variable that indicates whether at least ten percent of the cases are decided
with summary judgment procedures. In 1984, appellate systems
of seven states decided from ten to fifty percent of their appeals
in this manner.
seven range, and the research findings, of course, do not imply that large IAC's would
maintain current levels of efficiency if they sat en bane.
Here again, Table 2 cannot be compared to Table 3 because the greatest changes in
panel size tend to occur when IAC's are created or greatly expanded.
71. Perhaps, however, opinions take longer to write when there are larger panels because the opinion author must try to incorporate more views. Larger panels may also
provide more opportunity for dissenting opinions. But these concerns probably affect
only a small minority of a state's appeals, where the issues lend themselves to divergent
views.
72. There were 24 within-state changes in the 15% dummy variable in Table 2, and
13 for the 50% dummy variable. Comparable figures for Table 3 are nine and five for
supreme courts without IAC's, 10 and five for mid-range states, and four and three for
states with large IAC's. Statistics for the percentage of cases argued are available for 30
of the 44 states. A regression containing only these states showed that the percentage of
cases argued had a significant impact on productivity (coefficient =. -.0025, T-Ratio =
4.00).
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In the overall regression (Table 2), this variable shows no impact on output. The same result was obtained in Table 3 for
supreme courts (five of which adopted summary judgment procedures). The final two analyses show barely significant impacts,
in opposite directions. These results, however, are incomplete
because each analysis contained only one state that adopted
summary judgment procedures.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The volume of decisions by state appellate courts has grown
dramatically, as has the judges' productivity. Exploring the reasons for this growth is difficult because numerous interacting
factors influence output and productivity. This research uses the
only feasible research design for such a task, the multiple timeseries design.
The analysis found that changes intended to increase appellate court productivity usually have that effect, although the impact is often not substantial. Importantly, the study found that
adding judges ordinarily produces a corresponding increase in
the number of appeals decided (provided, of course, that filings
also increase). Supreme courts, however, may exhibit slight "declining returns to scale." Assigning temporary judges to appellate courts also helps increase the volume of appeals decided.
The most effective procedural changes are those that reduce
the burden of writing and publishing opinions. Deciding cases
without opinion greatly increases court output, and reducing the
number of opinions published has a lesser, but still substantial,
impact. Issuing unsigned memorandum or per curium opinions,
rather than full signed opinions, has but a slight impact.
Reducing the number of cases argued also has a moderate impact on productivity. In conducting our research, we were not
able to gather information concerning the actual length of oral
arguments, but we determined that rule changes that reduce
time limits for arguments have no impact.
The fact that curtailing opinion writing and publication, and
limiting arguments increase appellate court efficiency does not,
of course, automatically lead to a recommendation that these
practices be adopted. Many have argued that such changes reduce the quality of justice provided by the courts. The present
research looks only at the impact of changes on the number of
cases decided per judge. Before judges or others can apply these
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findings, they must factor in their feelings about the potential
impact on the quality of appellate justice.
The act of creating intermediate courts, or expanding their jurisdiction, in itself increases the productivity of the entire appellate system. This occurs even after controlling for contemporaneous changes, such as adding judges, using three-judge panels,
and routing minor appeals to the appellate courts rather than to
general jurisdiction trial courts.
Changes found to have very little or no impact include reducing panel size, adopting summary procedures, and adding staff
attorneys. Adding law clerks has a small impact. Appellate
courts commonly make these changes in the belief that they will
help them cope with the rising caseloads. The research here suggests otherwise, and judges are advised to consider other
changes, especially reducing arguments and full opinions, when
desiring to increase productivity. There are, however, reasons for
making changes other than productivity concerns-changes that
are beyond the scope of this research. For example, law clerks
and staff attorneys may well increase the quality of information
used by judges when making decisions.
When all is said and done, the greatest determinant of the
number of decisions is the number of filings. Caseload pressures
are by far the most important stimulus increasing productivity,
and the great increase in decision output and productivity of appellate courts in recent decades is largely due to an equally great
increase in appeals filed. The implication is that when caseloads
rise, judges either work harder or reduce the amount of attention given each case in ways not measured here, such as by
spending less time reading briefs and transcripts. On the other
hand, filing growth does not lead to a one-to-one growth in decisions; for example, a ten percent filing increase typically stimulates about six percent more decisions. Therefore, unless more
judges are added or efficiency measures adopted, the average appellate court will soon fall hopelessly behind.

